Industry: Controlling Vendor Remote Access to Machines

Cybersecurity · 4 min

Industry: Industry

Articles by Ricardo Vaz

Manufacturers and integrators need remote access to industrial machines. Learn how to control that access, reduce risk and maintain the ability to provide support.

Industry: Controlling Vendor Remote Access to Machines

TL;DR

On the factory floor, vendors also come in through the network

In industry, production continuity often depends on machines, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), supervisory systems and other equipment maintained by manufacturers and integrators. To reduce travel and downtime, these vendors frequently rely on remote access for diagnostics, configuration and technical support. The problem arises when these connections are installed outside the company's usual management mechanisms, through routers with mobile connectivity, proprietary VPNs or remote control tools. Even when they are necessary and legitimate, they can create paths into industrial systems that are not properly inventoried or monitored. The goal is not to prevent remote support, but to ensure that each access has a known purpose, an identified owner and security conditions appropriate to the criticality of the equipment.

Access accumulates without a clear owner

Remote access does not always result from a centralized decision. A manufacturer installs a router to provide support, an integrator configures a VPN for periodic interventions, and another vendor uses its own platform to monitor how a machine is running. Over time, these solutions may remain active without any consolidated view of who is accessing what, which equipment, and with which permissions. Some connections use mobile networks or external services that do not pass through the corporate network's security mechanisms. For this reason, the inventory should also cover these communication channels, not just the connections visible on the company's firewalls. The resulting exposure should be assessed based on the systems that can be reached, the privileges granted and the potential impact on production and physical safety.

Operational technology requires its own criteria

Operational technology (OT) environments cannot be protected in exactly the same way as conventional workstations. A network change, an unexpected session interruption or an untested update can affect industrial processes, availability and physical safety. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 recommends that remote access be justified, limited to operational needs and subject to controls that do not compromise the systems' safety mechanisms. Multi-factor authentication is an important measure, but it may need to be implemented on an intermediary access platform when industrial equipment does not support it directly. Access conditions should therefore be defined jointly by IT, production, maintenance and vendors, taking into account machine criticality, intervention windows and recovery procedures.

A controlled entry point and temporary access

A recommended approach is to concentrate third-party remote access in a solution managed by the organization, preferably through a secure gateway in an intermediate network zone (DMZ), with segmentation between the corporate and industrial environments. This architecture makes it possible to apply common authentication, authorization and monitoring policies without giving vendors indiscriminate access to the production network. Each technician should use an individual identity, with multi-factor authentication, permissions limited to the necessary equipment, and access authorized for the period appropriate to the intervention. Where technically feasible and proportionate to the risk, sessions can be monitored and recorded for audit purposes. The solution should also make it possible to terminate unauthorized access without compromising machine operation. Centralizing does not mean depending on a single device: the availability and recovery of the platform should be considered in the architecture design.

From inventory to maintenance contracts

Implementation should begin with an inventory of existing remote access, identifying, for each machine or production line, the vendor, the technology used, the purpose, the accessible equipment and whether the connection needs to be permanent or temporary. This survey, validated with production and maintenance, makes it possible to set priorities and prepare a phased migration to controlled access mechanisms. In parallel, maintenance contracts should establish conditions for authorization, technician identification, permissions, activity logging, incident reporting and deactivation of access when it is no longer needed. It is also important to provide procedures for urgent interventions, so that a breakdown does not force the improvised use of uncontrolled connections. Not every situation allows existing connections to be eliminated immediately. Legacy equipment, warranty restrictions or continuous support requirements may call for specific solutions. In such cases, the risk should be documented and reduced through compensating measures, such as segmentation, communication restrictions and monitoring. Any change should be tested and coordinated with operational owners, ensuring that security does not compromise support or production continuity.

Control access without alienating those who maintain the machines

Remote access by manufacturers and integrators is an important component of industrial maintenance. The goal should not be to eliminate it indiscriminately, but to ensure that the organization knows, authorizes and monitors the connections used to support its machines. A sustainable strategy combines inventory, segmentation, appropriate authentication, limited permissions, logging and intervention procedures agreed with production and maintenance. The transition should start with the highest-risk access and proceed in phases, taking technical and contractual dependencies into account. This way, the company can reduce uncontrolled access paths without losing the ability to respond to breakdowns or compromising operational continuity. In OT environments, security should protect production, not make its maintenance impractical.

Related

References

  1. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 – Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security
  2. NCSC - Principle 3: Centralise and standardise network connections
  3. NCSC - Principle 5: Understand and document third-party risks to your OT system